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Supreme Court ruling in McMillian v. Monroe County

Just Mercy

The Supreme Court ruling in McMillian v. Monroe County narrowed the path to compensation for Walter McMillian after his wrongful conviction and imprisonment. By holding that Alabama county sheriffs are state officers, the Supreme Court of the United States accepted the classification Monroe County had used to resist responsibility for Sheriff Tom Tate’s misconduct. The decision restricted the prospect of recovering damages from the county for the conduct at the center of McMillian’s civil claim, even as the litigation eventually ended in a settlement with all parties.

The Civil Claim and the County’s Position

After McMillian’s release, his civil case sought compensation for misconduct by Tate, the sheriff of Monroe County, Alabama. The claim against the county could not be resolved with the other defendants, so McMillian’s lawyers appealed it to the Supreme Court of the United States. Their choice of defendant reflected a practical feature of civil litigation: officers accused of misconduct generally do not have personal resources sufficient to pay damages, so victims usually seek recovery from the government body or agency that employs them.

Monroe County contested that premise. It argued that Tate was not its employee, despite the fact that his jurisdiction was limited to the county, county voters elected him, and the county paid him. Instead, the county maintained that the sheriff was an employee of the State of Alabama. The distinction mattered because state governments are broadly protected from damages claims based on employees’ misconduct unless the employee works for an agency that can be sued. If Tate counted as a state officer, the county argued, Monroe County would not be liable—and the State of Alabama could not provide an alternative route to recovery.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In a closely divided 5–4 ruling, the Supreme Court of the United States held that county sheriffs in Alabama are state officers. That classification defeated the route McMillian had pursued against Monroe County: although Tate’s authority and election were county-based, the Court’s ruling placed him on the state side of the legal boundary that determined who could be made to pay for his misconduct.

The result did not establish that Tate had acted properly. Instead, it restricted which public entity could be held responsible in a civil suit and left McMillian without a viable recovery from the State of Alabama under the circumstances described in the case. The decision therefore turned on the legal status of the sheriff, not on a finding that the alleged misconduct was less serious. Its effect was especially consequential because the claim against the county concerned what McMillian’s lawyers regarded as the most egregious misconduct in his case.

Settlement and Its Limits

The ruling formed one part of a longer civil proceeding that had already involved a year of depositions, hearings, and pretrial litigation. McMillian’s lawyers ultimately reached a settlement with all parties, but the amount was lower than they had hoped. The settlement provided a few hundred thousand dollars; the Supreme Court’s decision had limited the prospect of obtaining more from Monroe County for Tate’s conduct.

The money nevertheless gave McMillian a way to restart his logging business. He loved returning to the woods and cutting timber, and described working outdoors from morning until night as a way to feel normal again. His return to that work was short-lived: a dislodged branch struck him while he was cutting a tree and broke his neck. After several weeks in very poor condition and with little care available, he stayed with Bryan Stevenson in Montgomery for several months. He regained mobility, but the injury ended his ability to cut trees and do difficult landscape work.

Accountability After the Ruling

The settlement brought financial relief, but it did not produce the level of compensation McMillian’s lawyers had sought, nor did it end Tate’s public career. Tate was reelected sheriff and, as Stevenson recounted, remained in office after more than twenty-five years in the position. The contrast is central to the ruling’s practical significance: McMillian could use the settlement to rebuild part of his life, while the legal classification that blocked a larger recovery left the county beyond liability for the sheriff’s misconduct.

The case thus exposes a divide between identifying wrongdoing and securing a remedy for it. McMillian’s civil action could reach a settlement, yet the ruling narrowed the public responsibility available for the conduct at issue. His return to logging shows what compensation could make possible; the limits on recovery and Tate’s continued tenure show what it could not undo.